The concept of deterrence Deterrence theory

1 concept of deterrence

1.1 proportionality
1.2 reciprocity
1.3 coercive credibility

the concept of deterrence

the use of military threats means deter international crises , war has been central topic of international security research @ least 2 hundred years. research has predominantly focused on theory of rational deterrence analyze conditions under conventional deterrence succeed or fail. alternative theories have challenged rational deterrence theory , have focused on organizational theory , cognitive psychology.

the concept of deterrence can defined use of threats 1 party convince party refrain initiating course of action. threat serves deterrent extent convinces target not carry out intended action because of costs , losses target incur. in international security, policy of deterrence refers threats of military retaliation directed leaders of 1 state leaders of in attempt prevent other state resorting threat of use of military force in pursuit of foreign policy goals.

as outlined huth, policy of deterrence can fit 2 broad categories being (i) preventing armed attack against state s own territory (known direct deterrence); or (ii) preventing armed attack against state (known extended deterrence). situations of direct deterrence occur when there territorial dispute between neighboring states in major powers united states not directly intervene. on other hand, situations of extended deterrence occur when great power becomes involved. latter has generated majority of interest in academic literature. building on these 2 broad categories, huth goes on outline deterrence policies may implemented in response pressing short-term threat (known immediate deterrence) or strategy prevent military conflict or short term threat arising (known general deterrence).

a successful deterrence policy must considered in not military terms, in political terms. in military terms, deterrence success refers preventing state leaders issuing military threats , actions escalate peacetime diplomatic , military cooperation crisis or militarized confrontation threatens armed conflict , possibly war. prevention of crises of wars not aim of deterrence. in addition, defending states must able resist political , military demands of potential attacking nation. if armed conflict avoided @ price of diplomatic concessions maximum demands of potential attacking nation under threat of war, cannot claimed deterrence has succeeded.

furthermore, jentleson et al. argue, 2 key sets of factors successful deterrence important being (i) defending state strategy firstly balances credible coercion , deft diplomacy consistent 3 criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, , coercive credibility, , secondly minimizes international , domestic constraints; , (ii) extent of attacking state s vulnerability shaped domestic political , economic conditions. in broad terms, state wishing implement strategy of deterrence succeed if costs of non-compliance can impose on, , benefits of compliance can offer to, state greater benefits of noncompliance , costs of compliance.

deterrence theory holds nuclear weapons intended deter other states attacking nuclear weapons, through promise of retaliation , possibly mutually assured destruction (mad). nuclear deterrence can applied attack conventional forces; example, doctrine of massive retaliation threatened launch nuclear weapons in response soviet attacks.

a successful nuclear deterrent requires country preserve ability retaliate, either responding before own weapons destroyed or ensuring second strike capability. nuclear deterrent composed of nuclear triad, in case of nuclear weapons owned united states, russia, people s republic of china , india. other countries, such united kingdom , france, have sea- , air-based nuclear weapons.

proportionality

jentleson et al. provide further detail in relation these factors. firstly, proportionality refers relationship between defending state s scope , nature of objectives being pursued, , instruments available use pursue this. more defending state demands of state, higher state s costs of compliance , greater need defending state s strategy increase costs of noncompliance , benefits of compliance. challenge, deterrence is, definition, strategy of limited means. george (1991) goes on explain deterrence may, not required to, go beyond threats actual use of military force; if force used, must limited , fall short of full-scale use or war otherwise fails. main source of disproportionality objective goes beyond policy change regime change. has been seen in cases of libya, iraq, , north korea defending states have sought change leadership of state in addition policy changes relating nuclear weapons programs.

reciprocity

secondly, jentleson et al. outline reciprocity involves explicit understanding of linkage between defending state s carrots , attacking state s concessions. balance lies neither in offering little late or in return, not offering too or little return.

coercive credibility

finally, coercive credibility requires that, in addition calculations costs , benefits of cooperation, defending state convincingly conveys attacking state non-cooperation has consequences. threats, uses of force, , other coercive instruments such economic sanctions must sufficiently credible raise attacking state s perceived costs of noncompliance. defending state having superior military capability or economic strength in not enough ensure credibility. indeed, 3 elements of balanced deterrence strategy more achieved if other major international actors united nations or nato supportive , if opposition within defending state s domestic politics limited.

the other important consideration outlined jentleson et al. must taken consideration domestic political , economic conditions within attacking state affecting vulnerability deterrence policies, , attacking state s ability compensate unfavourable power balances. first factor whether internal political support , regime security better served defiance, or if there domestic political gains made improving relations defending state. second factor economic calculation of costs military force, sanctions, , other coercive instruments can impose, , benefits trade , other economic incentives may carry. in part function of strength , flexibility of attacking state s domestic economy , capacity absorb or counter costs being imposed. third factor role of elites , other key domestic political figures within attacking state. extent these actors interests threatened defending state s demands, act prevent or block defending state s demands.