Rational deterrence theory Deterrence theory

1 rational deterrence theory

1.1 military balance
1.2 signaling , bargaining power
1.3 reputations resolve
1.4 interests @ stake

rational deterrence theory

the predominant approach theorizing deterrence has entailed use of rational choice , game-theoretic models of decision making (see game theory). deterrence theorists have consistently argued deterrence success more if defending state s deterrent threat credible attacking state. huth outlines threat considered credible if defending state possesses both military capabilities inflict substantial costs on attacking state in armed conflict, , if attacking state believes defending state resolved use available military forces. huth goes on explain 4 key factors consideration under rational deterrence theory being (i) military balance; (ii) signaling , bargaining power; (iii) reputations resolve; , (iv) interests @ stake.

the military balance

deterrence directed against state leaders have specific territorial goals seek attain either seizing disputed territory in limited military attack or occupying disputed territory after decisive defeat of adversary s armed forces. in either case, strategic orientation of potential attacking states short term , driven concerns military cost , effectiveness. successful deterrence, defending states need military capacity respond , in strength range of contingencies. deterrence fails when either defending state or attacking state under or overestimate others ability undertake particular course of action.

signaling , bargaining power

the central problem state seeks communicate credible deterrent threat through diplomatic or military actions defending states have incentive act if determined resist attack, in hope attacking state away military conflict seemingly resolved adversary. if defending states have such incentives, potential attacking states may discount statements made defending states along movement of military forces merely bluffs. in regards, rational deterrence theorists have argued costly signals required communicate credibility of defending state s resolve. costly signals actions , statements increase risk of military conflict , increase costs of backing down deterrent threat. states bluffing unwilling cross threshold of threat , military action fear of committing armed conflict.

reputations resolve

there 3 different arguments have been developed in relation role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes. first argument focuses on defending state s past behaviour in international disputes , crises, creates strong beliefs in potential attacking state defending state s expected behaviour in future conflicts. credibilities of defending state s policies arguably linked on time, , reputations resolve have powerful causal impact on attacking state s decision whether challenge either general or immediate deterrence. second approach argues reputations have limited impact on deterrence outcomes because credibility of deterrence heavily determined specific configuration of military capabilities, interests @ stake, , political constraints faced defending state in given situation of attempted deterrence. argument of school of thought potential attacking states not draw strong inferences defending states resolve prior conflicts because potential attacking states not believe defending state s past behaviour reliable predictor of future behaviour. third approach middle ground between first 2 approaches. argues potential attacking states draw reputational inferences resolve past behaviour of defending states under conditions. insight expectation decision makers use types of information when drawing inferences reputations, , attacking state updates , revises beliefs when unanticipated behaviour of defending state cannot explained case-specific variables. example both shows problem extends perception of third parties main adversaries , underlies way in attempts @ deterrence can not fail backfire if assumptions others perceptions incorrect.

interests @ stake

although costly signaling , bargaining power more established arguments in rational deterrence theory, interests of defending states not known, , attacking states may beyond short term bargaining tactics of defending state , seek determine interests @ stake defending state justify risks of military conflict. argument here defending states have greater interests @ stake in dispute more resolved use force , more willing endure military losses secure interests. less established arguments specific interests more salient state leaders such military interests versus economic interests.

furthermore, huth argues both supporters , critics of rational deterrence theory agree unfavourable assessment of domestic , international status quo state leaders can undermine or severely test success of deterrence. in rational choice approach, if expected utility of not using force reduced declining status quo position, deterrence failure more likely, since alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive.