Nuclear weapons and deterrence Deterrence theory

in 1966 schelling prescriptive in outlining impact of development of nuclear weapons in analysis of military power , deterrence. in 1966 analysis, before widespread use of assured second strike capability, or immediate reprisal, in form of ssbn submarines, schelling argues nuclear weapons give nations potential not destroy enemies humanity without drawing immediate reprisal because of lack of conceivable defense system , speed nuclear weapons can deployed. nation s credible threat of such severe damage empowers deterrence policies , fuels political coercion , military deadlock, in turn can produce proxy warfare.

historical analysis of nuclear weapons deterrent capabilities has led modern researchers concept of stability-instability paradox, whereby nuclear weapons confer large scale stability between nuclear weapon states, in on 60 years none have engaged in large direct warfare due nuclear weapons deterrence capabilities, instead forced pursuing political aims military means in form of comparatively smaller scale acts of instability, such proxy wars , minor conflicts.